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Abstract
We assess the potential damage and smoke production associated with the detonation
of small nuclear weapons in modern megacities. While the number of nuclear war-
heads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986, the
number of nuclear weapons states is increasing and the potential exists for numerous5
regional nuclear arms races. Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2
are constructing them, and an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material
needed to build substantial arsenals of low-yield (Hiroshima-sized) explosives. Pop-
ulation and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in
megacities, which might be targeted in a nuclear conflict. Our analysis shows that, per10
kiloton of yield, low yield weapons can produce 100 times as many fatalities and 100
times as much smoke from fires as high-yield weapons, if they are targeted at city cen-
ters. A single “small” nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities,
in some cases by orders of magnitude, than have occurred in the major historical con-
flicts of many countries. We analyze the likely outcome of a regional nuclear exchange15
involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current
global nuclear arsenal). We find that such an exchange could produce direct fatalities
comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for
a “counterforce” nuclear war between the superpowers. Megacities exposed to atmo-
spheric fallout of long-lived radionuclides would likely be abandoned indefinitely, with20
severe national and international implications. Our analysis shows that smoke from
urban firestorms in a regional war would rise into the upper troposphere due to pyro-
convection. Robock et al. (2006) show that the smoke would subsequently rise deep
into the stratosphere due to atmospheric heating, and then might induce significant
climatic anomalies on global scales. We also anticipate substantial perturbations of25
global ozone. While there are many uncertainties in the predictions we make here,
the principal unknowns are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. The scope
and severity of the hazards identified pose a significant threat to the global community.
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They deserve careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section
of the world scientific community, as well as widespread public debate.
1 Introduction
In the 1980s, quantitative studies of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between
the superpowers provoked international scientific and political debate, and deep public5
concern (Crutzen and Birks, 1982; Turco et al., 1983; Pittock et al., 1989). The result-
ing recognition that such conflicts could produce global scale damage at unacceptable
levels contributed to an ongoing reduction of nuclear arsenals and improvements in
relationships between the major nuclear powers. Here we provide the first comprehen-
sive quantitative study of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between the emerging10
smaller nuclear states, including the use of a single nuclear weapon by a state or ter-
rorist. Robock et al. (2006) explore the climate changes that might occur due to the
smoke emissions from such a conflict.
The potential effects of nuclear explosions having yields similar to those of the
weapons used over Japan during the Second World War (WW-II) are, in relation to15
yield, unexpectedly large. At least eight countries are capable of transport and detona-
tion of such nuclear devices. Moreover, North Korea appears to have a growing stock-
pile of warheads, and Iran is suspiciously pursuing uranium enrichment – a necessary
precursor to weapons construction. Thirty-two other countries that do not now have nu-
clear weapons possess sufficient fissionable nuclear materials to construct weapons,20
some in a relatively short period of time. For these nations, a regional conflict involving
modest numbers of 15-kiloton (kt, the TNT explosive yield equivalent) weapons to at-
tack cities could cause casualties that exceed, in some cases by orders of magnitude,
their losses in previous conflicts. Indeed, in some case, the casualties can rival previ-
ous estimates for a limited strategic war between the superpowers involving thousands25
of weapons carrying several thousand megatons (Mt) of yield. Early radioactive fallout
from small nuclear ground bursts would leave large sections of target areas contam-
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inated and effectively uninhabitable. Because of the smoke released in fires ignited
by detonations, there is a possibility that 50 to 100 15-kt weapons used against city
centers would produce global climate disturbances unprecedented in recorded human
history (Robock et al., 2006). An individual in possession of one of the thousands of
existing lightweight nuclear weapons could kill or injure a million people in a terrorist5
attack.
Below we first discuss the arsenals of the existing, and potential, nuclear powers.
We then describe the casualties due to blast and to fires set by thermal radiation from
an attack on a single megacity with one low yield nuclear weapon. Next we discuss
the casualties if current and projected arsenals of such weapons were ever used in a10
regional conflict. We then discuss the impact of radioactive contamination. Finally, we
describe the amounts of smoke that may be generated in a regional scale conflict. At
the end of each of these sections we outline the associated uncertainties.
We have attempted to employ realistic scenarios in this analysis. However, we do
not have access to the war plans of any countries, nor to verifiable data on existing nu-15
clear arsenals, delivery systems, or plans to develop, build or deploy nuclear weapons.
There are obviously many possible pathways for regional conflicts to develop. Opin-
ions concerning the likelihood of a regional nuclear war range from highly improbable
to apocalyptic. Conservatism in such matters requires that a range of plausible sce-
narios be considered, given the availability of weapons hardware and the history of20
regional conflict. In the present analysis, we adopt two potential scenarios: i) a single
small nuclear device detonated in a city center by terrorists; and ii) a regional nuclear
exchange between two newly minted nuclear weapons states involving a total of 100
low yield (15-kt) detonations. We do not justify these scenarios any further except to
note that most citizens and politicians today are aware of the potential disaster of an25
Israeli-Iranian-Syrian nuclear confrontation, or a Indian-Pakistani territorial confronta-
tion. Moreover, as nuclear weapons knowledge and implementation proliferates, the
possible number and combinations of flash points multiplies. The fact that nuclear
weapons of the type assumed here have been used in past hostilities substantiates the
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idea that such scenarios as we propose are executable.
2 Nuclear arsenals
Table 1 lists the world’s known nuclear arsenals. Five countries were recognized as
Nuclear Weapons States in the 1968 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:
France, People’s Republic of China, Russia (formerly USSR), United Kingdom and the5
United States. There are about 30 000 nuclear warheads worldwide, 95% being held
by Russia and the U.S. There is enough refined and unrefined nuclear explosive mate-
rial in the world to construct another 100 000 weapons (National Academy of Sciences,
2005). No state has revealed the precise number of warheads in its stockpile (National
Academy of Sciences, 2005). However, the strategic arsenals of Britain, France, Rus-10
sia, and the U.S. can be reasonably estimated from treaties that verifiably limit the
number and capacity of delivery systems. The U.S. and Russia also have significant
stockpiles of strategic warheads in reserve, or in storage, beyond those devoted to cur-
rent strategic delivery systems. The numbers of tactical weapons, including mines, ar-
tillery shells, depth charges, and bombs are more uncertain; for example, the Russian15
tactical stockpile is known only to within 5000 devices (National Academy of Sciences,
2005). Figure 1 plots the trends of nuclear warheads (excluding about 10 000 of inde-
terminate status in Russia for 2002) during the past several decades. As may be seen
the numbers of warheads has declined by roughly a factor of 3 in the past two decades.
There are currently three De Facto nuclear weapons states, which have developed20
weapons outside of the restrictions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: India, Is-
rael, and Pakistan. The arsenals of India, Israel and Pakistan (as well as China) are
not well documented. The numbers of warheads they control was determined by sev-
eral researchers by first estimating the amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or
of plutonium that could have been produced by each country and allocated to military25
uses, as opposed to civilian applications. An assumption is then made regarding the
amounts of fissionable material needed for each warhead. While all of the available
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material in military hands may not be assembled into weapons, the numbers in Ta-
ble 1 assume it has. We omit possible nuclear devices in North Korea, although it is
estimated that 10 plutonium weapons in the 10–20 kt range may have been produced
(Norris and Kristensen, 2005b).
India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998. There are significant differences5
between the stated yields of the devices in these tests and those estimated from seis-
mic studies (Wallace, 1998). However, the yields of some of the devices were similar
to the first weapons tested by the U.S., and those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
during WW-II. India claims to have both fusion and fission devices (Norris and Kris-
tensen, 2005d). It has been suggested that India may attempt to build nuclear parity10
with France, Britain, and China in the next 5–7 years by constructing 300–400 war-
heads deployed on a triad of delivery systems (missile, aircraft, and submarine) (Norris
and Kristensen, 2005d).
Several countries possessed nuclear weapons in the past, but abandoned them.
South Africa constructed six devices, which they destroyed, possibly after one nu-15
clear test (Albright et al., 1997). Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan inherited nuclear
weapons with the fall of the Soviet Union, but have transferred them to Russia.
As summarized in Table 2, there are a large number of countries that possess the
raw materials needed to construct nuclear weapons, mainly in their civilian nuclear
reactor programs. Altogether, 45 nations are identified in Table 2 as having previous20
nuclear weapons programs, current weapons stockpiles, or the potential to become nu-
clear states. Thirteen countries operate plutonium and/or uranium enrichment facilities,
including Iran. Obtaining fissionable material, the most difficult step in constructing a
weapon, is as straightforward as operating a civilian power reactor system in tandem
with a Pu reprocessing facility of appropriate sophistication. All of the necessary tech-25
nology, equipment, and expertise are available through international markets, which
are nominally regulated to prevent proliferation. Nevertheless, as has become appar-
ent over the past decade, nations wishing to build nuclear weapons seem quite capable
of doing so despite international restrictions and treaties. In all, 19 countries have had
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programs to develop nuclear weapons, notably Argentina, Brazil, North Korea, South
Korea, and Taiwan (Albright et al., 1997). In 1992 the International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguarded less than 1% of the world’s HEU and only about 35% of the world
inventory of Pu (Albright et al., 1997). Today a similarly small fraction is safeguarded.
The possible number of nuclear devices in Table 2 that could be constructed from5
existing inventories of Pu and HEU in various countries ranges from one to tens of
thousands. We assumed in constructing Table 2, that 10 kg of Pu is needed for each
warhead, but we did not distinguish Pu that has been separated from fuel rods from
that which has not been separated, and we did not distinguish Pu which is enriched in
the favored isotope,
239
Pu. Weapons constructed by the U.S. and Russia are thought10
to contain about 3–4 kg of Pu; it has also been suggested that Indian weapons av-
erage 5 kg of Pu. For HEU, 25 kg per device was assumed to derive Table 2. HEU
exists in various states of enrichment of
235
U, and we do not specifically distinguish
weapons-grade material. However, once uranium is enriched to the level of HEU, most
of the work needed to achieve weapons grade has already been done, and HEU itself15
can be used in weapons. There are 8 current states with nuclear weapons, 1 (North
Korea) constructing weapons and one (Iran) believed to be actively seeking such de-
vices. Another 32 states possess fissionable material from which weapons could be
produced.
Many nuclear weapons are small in size and light in weight and could easily be trans-20
ported in a car or van. The weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki weighed
4040 kg and 4900 kg respectively (Gibson, 1996). Subsequent designs have reduced
warhead weight-per-yield and size substantially. For example, 300 of the Intercontinen-
tal Ballistic Missile warheads in the U.S. arsenal weigh only ∼100 kg each, while the
remaining 850 warheads weigh less than 300 kg each (Gibson, 1996). U.S. submarine-25
based weapons are similarly light in weight. The U.S. also has about 480 non-strategic
B61 bombs deployed in six European countries, with yields of 100–500 kt and weights
of ∼300 kg (Gibson, 1996). The U.S. produced (and retired) 2000 W33 artillery shells,
20 cm in width and 94 cm in length weighing ∼110 kg with a yield of 5–10 kt (Gibson,
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1996).
The number of nuclear weapons owned by various nations, how many could be suc-
cessfully delivered, and where they would be delivered are the major uncertainties in
the present analysis. As pointed out by the National Academy of Sciences (2005) and
Albright et al. (1997) better estimates of the numbers of weapons will only be obtained5
if nations agree to disclose such information. As discussed below there are many sce-
narios for how wars might be fought. In this paper we have focused on the delivery of
about 50 low yield warheads on urban centers, because that is a rough estimate of the
numbers currently existing in the smallest known nuclear arsenals (Table 1). One may
argue that the smallest nuclear states currently are not capable of delivering even 5010
low yield weapons. However, history shows that once states develop nuclear weapons,
they continue to develop more of them, with higher yields. Our idealized study involves
about 0.3% of the world’s arsenal by number and only 0.03% by yield. If regional nu-
clear arms races continue to develop, the numbers of weapons and their yields can
easily exceed the examples we discuss here.15
3 Potential fatalities from a Hiroshima-sized explosion in a major city
To compute the number of fatalities or casualties from a nuclear detonation, N, we use
Eq. (1).
Nfatalities/casualties =
2pi∫
0
R∫
0
rP (r, θ)α(r)dθdr (1)
The integral is numerically evaluated over sectors of a city in which the population20
density, P , varies in space. The probability of fatality or casualty, α depends on r, the
distance from the detonation point, or “ground zero.” R is the maximum distance from
ground zero for which the product of P and α yields more than one fatality or casualty
in a grid cell. The probabilities for death or injury depend on the types of buildings,
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the degree of exposure of the population, the time of day, weather, topography, and
numerous other factors. However, we assume α only depends on distance from ground
zero.
Nuclear weapons cause direct destruction, death and injuries mainly through the ef-
fects of prompt energetic gamma and neutron radiation, blast overpressure and winds,5
and thermal radiance from the fireball (thermal pulse). (The subsequent effects of
exposure to radioactive fallout are discussed in Sect. 5). While there have been at-
tempts to estimate damage and casualties associated with nuclear detonations of vari-
ous yields on the basis of the physical perturbations, there are numerous uncertainties
in making such projections. However, for the scenarios considered in this work the10
explosive yields correspond to those of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs, for
which considerable data have been collected documenting deaths and injuries. While
the detailed vulnerability of individuals in modern megacities is likely to be significantly
different from that at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we propose that the overall casualty
probabilities should be similar to first-order, particularly in the central zone of heavy de-15
struction where most deaths occur. Accordingly, for the purpose of assessing potential
fatalities in a future nuclear conflict or terrorist attack, we will rely on the outcomes of
the atomic bombing of Japan in World War II.
Figure 2 shows the Hiroshima and Nagasaki fatality rates from two independent
studies (Oughterson and Warren, 1956; Ishikawa and Swain, 1981). The fraction of20
people killed within Hiroshima and Nagasaki is similar, despite the fact that the energy
released by the weapon dropped at Hiroshima was 15±3 kt, while that at Nagasaki
was 21±2 kt. The relatively higher rate of death in Hiroshima is probably due to the
geography of the city. Nagasaki has more hills that shadowed areas from the blast
and thermal radiation. The firestorm in Hiroshima was also more violent due to the dry25
conditions and flat terrain, which promoted widespread ignition (Ishikawa and Swain,
1981). Figure 3 illustrates the total casualty probabilities in Hiroshima (Ishikawa and
Swain, 1981). Casualties include fatalities and injuries, counting either only serious
injuries that are life-threatening in the short run, or all injuries including those minor
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injuries that are not immediately life-threatening but could become disabling.
We have fit normal distributions to the probability data in Figs. 2 and 3 using a stan-
dard form: α(r)=exp(−r2/2σ2). Here, α is the relative probability of fatalities or casu-
alties at a given range, r , from ground zero, and σ is the effective scaling distance, or
distribution width, for the effects of interest. Values of σ derived from the data in Figs. 25
and 3 are summarized in Table 3. We used the data from Ishikawa and Swain (1981)
to calibrate the casualty distributions because these data refer to the period a year
following the explosions when the most serious injuries would have been resolved,
and outcomes at each level of effect would be clear. The derived distributions may,
nonetheless, represent a conservative estimate of fatalities in the sense that medical10
attention following the Japanese wartime atomic bombing may have been more acces-
sible than would be the case following an attack on a modern megacity, especially in
the developing world.
The Hiroshima and Nagasaki explosions were airbursts. For a ground burst of the
same yield, the thermal radiation at a given intensity covers only about 50% of the area15
of an airburst, because the fractional conversion of yield to radiant energy changes
from 0.35 for an airburst to 0.18 for a ground burst (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). In
addition, the areas affected by overpressure also vary between air and ground bursts.
For example, the area within the 10 pound-per-square-inch (psi) contour for a ground
burst is about 50% of that for an airburst, while the area within the 2 psi contour for20
a ground burst is about 38% of that for an airburst (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). To
adjust the probability curves for computing fatalities and casualties from ground bursts,
we divide the appropriate σ in Table 3 by a factor of
√
2. This effectively reduces the
impacted area by 50% relative to an airburst of the same yield, roughly compensating
for the reduced range of both overpressure and thermal radiation effects.25
The probability distributions derived above were combined with spatial distributions
of population around specific target sites to determine total fatalities and injuries for
particular detonation scenarios. We chose target sites by first determining the popu-
lation within a 3 km radius about each grid cell in the LandScan for 2003 population
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data base (LandScan, 2003). The LandScan data base provides the 24-h average
ambient population. We then chose the most populated of these regions subject to
the constraint that the central cell was separated by at least 6 km from the center cell
of the nearest alternative high population density group of cells. The population data
are aggregated into cells that are 30 arc-seconds on a side – an area less than 1 km
2
5
at the latitudes of interest. In these calculations, we did not consider the accumulated
casualties from multiple bursts in overlap zones within 3 km of ground zero. In practice,
for the most densely populated regions, fatalities from the blast and thermal radiation of
a 15-kt explosion do not occur beyond about 5 km from ground zero, and minor injuries
do not occur beyond about 9 km.10
Table 4 presents fatalities and Table 5 casualties for airbursts exploded at “optimum”
height over the most densely populated, and second most densely populated, regions
in a number of countries, as well as for a ground burst in the most densely populated re-
gion. These results could represent the consequences of a terrorist attack, or a limited
nuclear strike or retaliation. Note that the casualties from the direct effects alone using15
one weapon can number more than one million even though these scenarios assume
low yield weapons. Compared to airbursts, explosions at the ground produce compa-
rable, but somewhat lower, total fatalities – including deaths attributable to radioactive
fallout as discussed below. Several previous researchers have investigated casualties
in individual cities; for example McKinzie et al. (2001) use an approach similar to ours20
for Pakistan and India.
The number of fatalities during WW-II in Hiroshima has been estimated at
140 000±10 000, and in Nagasaki, 70 000±10 000 (Ishikawa and Swain, 1981). Mod-
ern megacities have higher population densities than Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and
consequently would suffer greater fatalities, as indicated in Table 4. Historical wars25
in most countries, including India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Argentina, and Brazil, have
caused fatalities (Table 4) of only a few percent of those that could be produced by a
single airburst.
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There are numerous uncertainties in computing fatalities and casualties. We believe
that the uncertainties in our analysis, such as using the casualty probability curves
from Hiroshima, and using the LandScan population database, are relatively small.
The greatest uncertainty, as noted in the introduction, is likely to lie in the targeting of
the weapons. For example, the populations of some urban areas vary greatly between5
day and night due to commuting patterns. Hence, casualties will depend on the time
of day of the attack. The LandScan data base defines a 24-h average population
density, which therefore lies between the extreme possibilities. Casualties will also
depend upon whether the urban areas have been evacuated in advance of the attack
or whether bomb shelters exist. We have assumed there has been no evacuation,10
or effective use of shelters. Firstly, urgent evacuation of megacities has never been
successfully attempted. Moreover, few of these cities have nuclear-capable shelters
in any number. While some modern buildings are better designed to survive shock
waves, and are less likely to ignite, we have implicitly assumed that all buildings would
respond like those in Hiroshima during World War II. Some cities may have complex15
topography that may provide partial sheltering as in Nagasaki. As discussed in Sect. 4
some targets have several times higher populations densities and will therefore have
higher fatalities than others. In this section of the paper we chose an example based on
attacks on the most densely populated areas in each country. The effects of choosing
alternative urban targets is discussed in Sect. 4.20
4 Potential direct casualties in a regional war
Several groups, considering a range of exchange scenarios, estimated the direct casu-
alties in a full-scale nuclear war prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the easing
of tensions between the larger nuclear powers. Tens of thousands of weapons were
available in the 1980s with most in the 100 kt to Mt yield range. Varying assumptions25
about targeting of the weapons, and the number of weapons used led to casualty es-
timates differing by more than a factor of ten. Another source of differences between
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casualty estimates is the scaling of casualty probabilities from low yield weapons, such
as the one used in Hiroshima, to high yield weapons. Most researchers use blast dam-
age to scale casualty probabilities. Others have used fire potential, which leads to a
greater damage area and generally higher casualty figures by factors of 2.5–4 (Postol,
1986).5
At the high end of casualty projections, the Ambio study (Middleton, 1982) assumed
14747 detonations (173 in the Southern Hemisphere) totaling 5569Mt. Although, as
Table 1 indicates, such a conflict could still be fought today, many of the warheads
would need to be taken from storage. The Ambio analysis assumed weapons exploded
over nearly every city of modest size in the world (most of Africa, South America, and10
New Zealand were spared). Of the 1 300 000 000 people then living in urban areas of
the Northern Hemisphere, it was estimated that 750 000 000 would die immediately,
340 000000 would be seriously injured – and of those 200 000000 would perish soon
there after. Harwell (1984) considered an attack confined to the U.S. involving more
than 3000 weapons and 1400Mt yield, and found that 50 000000–100 000 000 people15
might die from blast, thermal radiation, and fires. OTA (1979) summarized several
U.S. government studies of a range of scenarios, including a full-scale attack on the
U.S. against military and economic targets involving thousands of weapons releasing
thousands of megatons of explosive energy. They suggested that casualties, primarily
due to blast, would lie in the range of 20 000 000–160 000000 people. The range of20
casualties was largely due to assumptions about evacuations of urban areas, and use
of shelters. They also examined a “counterforce attack,” in which military facilities were
attacked while U.S. urban centers were not directly targeted. In this case, fatalities,
due largely to fallout, were estimated to be 2 000 000–20 000000 people. Daugherty
et al. (1986) pointed out that many strategic targets lie near population centers. They25
considered a counterforce attack on the U.S. with 3000 warheads and 1340Mt yield,
and deduced that 7 000 000–19 000 000 deaths might occur immediately from blast and
fires in urban areas. Many more fatalities could also be associated with radioactive
fallout.
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While the use of thousands of high-yield weapons would certainly lead to more ca-
sualties than might occur in a small attack or exchange with low-yield weapons, we find
that the number of casualties is not reduced in proportion to the total yield. For exam-
ple, even today Russia and the U.S. maintain much larger arsenals than are needed to
strike all significant military targets as well as every moderate to large city in the world.5
Many weapons are aimed at the same target, or aimed at missile silos or submarines in
unpopulated regions. For high-yield weapons in the Mt range, much of the area inside
the destruction zone would be sparsely populated- even in large cities- as the popula-
tion density decreases rapidly toward the perimeter. Therefore, based on the present
results, relatively small numbers of low yield weapons targeted at densely populated10
urban centers may lead to similar casualties as in a full-scale counterforce war.
In our computations we have assumed that the densest population centers in each
country are targeted. Scenarios that purposefully target population centers with nu-
clear weapons, at least in the case of escalating military hostilities between nations,
might be challenged on several grounds. For one thing, such an act would invite re-15
taliation in kind. Further, military facilities, and especially the nuclear assets of an
adversary, would seem to be the targets of choice in an actual wartime situation. On
the other hand, rapid-fire, intense urban targeting would inflict the greatest damage
on an adversary nation. Combined with military bombardment, urban targeting, con-
stitutes an all-out engagement aimed at permanently crippling an opponent. In that20
sense, the “small” war scenarios assumed here are similar in principal, if not in scale,
to the strategies of all-out nuclear warfare and warfighting embraced by the superpow-
ers in the mid-20th century in the context of “mutually assured destruction.” It is also
possible that a country that does not have enough weapons to target the entire military
infrastructure of an opponent to prevent effective retaliation may target urban areas to25
inflict maximum damage. This argument implies that the most dangerous phase in pro-
liferation might occur as the country just begins to acquire weapons capability. Such
new nuclear powers may be more likely to target urban areas and more likely to use
the weapons first if they don’t believe they could survive an opponents first strike.
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Below we consider a nuclear war in which 50 weapons of 15 kt yield are detonated
on two opposing nations. The total yield in this case is 1.5Mt, roughly 0.1% or less
of the total yields proposed in previous scenarios for a full-scale nuclear war as dis-
cussed above. Such a scenario is consistent with the potential arsenals of the smallest
recognized nuclear powers, India and Pakistan. One may argue that this scenario is5
currently implausible because India and Pakistan would need to have their entire arse-
nals assembled, and a high success rate of delivery to cause 50 nuclear explosions in
each territory. However, other nuclear powers have many more weapons and sophisti-
cated delivery systems and could launch such an attack. Moreover, once states begin
to assemble nuclear weapons they tend to continue to build their arsenals. For exam-10
ple, India may be moving toward an arsenal comparable to that of China, Britain and
France (Norris and Kristensen, 2005d). North Korea has reactors, which if completed
and made fully operational, could produce enough fissionable material to produce 50
warheads per year (Norris and Kristensen, 2005b). Whether Pakistan is planning such
a reactor is uncertain, but India has recently signed a treaty with the U.S. allowing15
the continued, and unmonitored, production of fissionable materials. Numerous coun-
tries listed in Table 2 have the uranium and/or plutonium to make very large numbers
of weapons. Hence we consider an attack involving two countries using 50 low-yield
weapons to be within the range of the smallest nuclear powers today, and potentially
attainable by many countries in the near future.20
Tables 6 and 7 present our estimates of the fatalities and casualties due to targeting
50 15-kt weapons on the leading population centers in a number of countries. The total
fatalities in Table 6 range from 2600000–16700 000. An attack on India, for example,
would lead to many more fatalities than a similar attack on Pakistan because of India’s
greater number of large population centers.25
In most of our simulations targets cluster within the megacities located in the com-
batant countries. For example, Fig. 4, shows the locations of the 28 targets in Japan
that fall within the Tokyo-Yokohama region for an attack on Japan using 15-kt yield
weapons targeted at the 50 densest population centers. In many countries, half the
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fatalities occur in a single megacity in our scenario, as summarized in Fig. 5.
Figure 6 shows that fatalities are relatively uniformly spread over the 50 targets in
most countries, so that fatalities are not strongly dependent on the details of the choice
of targets. For instance, in India and for China, 19 explosions account for roughly half
the total airburst fatalities from a 50 weapon attack.5
The fatalities in Table 6 for a 50-weapon attack on the United States are compara-
ble to those previously estimated for a limited or counterforce attack involving 3000
weapons and 1300Mt (OTA, 1979; Daugherty et al., 1986). Scaled against total
weapon yield, the fatalities per kiloton are 100 times greater in the small weapon sce-
nario, even when full scale urban targeting has been considered in past scenarios10
(Harwell, 1984). The high fatality rate of low yield weapons is not due to any non-
linear phenomena. Rather, the low fatality per kiloton for large yield weapons results
from many weapons being targeted at areas with relatively low population density, in-
cluding the suburbs of urban areas and isolated military targets, and weapons being
redundantly targeted with respect to overlapping overpressure contours. Table 6 also15
shows that a regional exchange between India and Pakistan, in which each side used
50 weapons, could lead to more than 21 million fatalities, which is equivalent to about
half of the global fatalities in WW-II. Only a small number of weapons are needed to
produce the same fatalities in a given country as occurred among that country’s citi-
zens during WW-II, or in other major historical wars. For example, three weapons of20
15-kt yield exploding in the U.S. could lead to more U.S. fatalities than occurred during
all of WW-II.
The uncertainties discussed for individual targets in Sect. 3 also apply to a regional
scale war. Generally we believe the greatest uncertainties have to do with targeting
issues, such as the time of day of the attack and whether cities have been evacuated25
before an attack. For a regional scale war the numbers and yields of weapons that
are actually exploded, and the targets chosen is a significant uncertainty. As illustrated
in Fig. 6 the numbers of fatalities varies almost linearly with the numbers of weapons
used for the 50 most populated regions in each country.
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5 Radioactive fallout
In previous calculations for a full-scale nuclear war, radioactive fallout was a significant
source of fatalities. For example, Harwell (1984) predicted about 25% of the United
States land area would be exposed to a long-term fatal dose of radiation, resulting
in 50 000 000 to 70 000 000 fatalities in addition to those due to direct effects such5
as blast. The radioactivity is primarily associated with surface explosions, which are
typically used to attack “hardened” or buried military targets, such as missile silos.
However, surface bursts generally cause fewer blast or fire fatalities. Harwell (1984),
for example, found that when all of the urban explosions were surface bursts, the total
number of fatalities was actually reduced by 10 000000.10
There have been numerous studies of early radioactive fallout from nuclear surface
bursts, and potential exposure to energetic radiation, especially gamma rays, emit-
ted by the residual radionuclides. Early fallout consists of the dust-borne radioactive
byproducts deposited on the ground during the first day or so after a nuclear surface
explosion. Surface bursts raise large amounts of dust, which carries most of the short-15
lived radioactive isotopes released in fission detonations. Subsequent fallout patterns
depend on the dust particle size distribution, height of the stabilized debris cloud, and
local weather, among other factors. Airbursts generally are assumed to produce no
early fallout unless it is raining, as discussed below. In general, most of the lethal
fallout from a small surface burst (e.g., 15 kt) is deposited within one to two hours of20
detonation, and within several tens of kilometers of ground zero. Moreover, the threat of
fallout exposure within 2–3 km of such a burst is secondary to the hazards associated
with prompt radiation (emitted at the time of detonation), blast, and thermal radiation.
Since these latter effects are directly accounted for by the casualty curves discussed
above, we will not be concerned here with detailed modeling of the fallout closer than25
one or two kilometers to ground zero (although the model discussed below will roughly
account for this fallout).
Given the complexity of the fallout problem, and sensitivity to parameters such as
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wind speed, rainfall and dust particle size that cannot be determined in advance, we
utilize the simplified fallout model documented by Glasstone and Dolan (1977) to com-
pute areas subject to given exposure levels downwind of a surface contact burst.
In applying the model, Table 9.93 and Fig. 9.26 of Glasstone and Dolan (1977) are
used to characterize the dose rate, and integrated dose, downwind of a 15-kt fission5
ground burst. The results are summarized in Fig. 7 in terms of the potential external
gamma ray dose that would be received after 48 h of continuous exposure over a per-
fectly flat surface as a function of distance from the detonation. The derived doses
must be corrected for terrain and sheltering as discussed below. Typically, 50–60% of
the total fission radioactivity produced by a surface burst is deposited as early fallout,10
and this factor is incorporated in the model (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977; Shapiro et al.,
1986).
The model (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977) assumes there is a steady 24-km/h wind
with minimal wind shear. We take the wind to blow directly toward the east, as pre-
vailing westerlies. The delay in fallout exposure associated with transport from the15
detonation point is accounted for by estimating the arrival time using the derived dis-
tance and known wind speed. The fallout radiation dose rate decays in proportion to
t
−1.2
, with time, t, measured in appropriate units (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). Given
an arrival time, and an exposure interval of 2 days, a dose rate “multiplying factor” can
be obtained by time integration of the dose rate. The actual 48-h dose is then the20
product of the reference time dose rate and the multiplying factor.
Figure 7a shows the potential maximum 48-h whole-body dose as a function of
downwind distance from a 15-kt burst. Figure 7b gives the ground zero crosswind
width of the contour delimiting that dose. The data in Figs. 7a and 7b have been fit with
power law functions for convenience in our analysis. The 48-h unsheltered exposure at25
each distance directly downwind of a surface detonation can be reasonably estimated
using the relation,
D = 266 000
/
L1.838 (2)
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where D is the integrated dose in rad, and L is the distance from ground zero in km.
Note that Eq. (2) can be inverted to give the maximum downwind extent for any specific
dose, D. The simplified model of Glasstone and Dolan (1977) also predicts that, for a
15-kt fission explosion, the width of the dose contour is nearly independent of the
range from the detonation point. Hence, we further assume that for a particular dose,5
the contour width, W (km), remains constant over the range given by Eq. (2). The fit in
Fig. 7b gives this width as,
W = 40
/
D0.5486. (3)
Based on the assumptions stated above, the derived exposure footprints for early
fallout from a 15-kt surface burst consist of rectangular areas, LxW, defined through10
Eqs. (2) and (3), that extend to the east of the burst point.
For the scenarios considered here, the population grid cells are generally compa-
rable to or larger in width than the exposure contours that fall within the lethal range.
Moreover, in multiple burst scenarios, the dose contours often overlap. In cases where
we must estimate the affected population in sub-grid areas, we assume a uniform pop-15
ulation density within affected grid cells, so that the exposed population is directly
proportional to the fractional area. We also sum exposures from overlapping explo-
sion contours. Figure 8a, for example, illustrates the 48-h exposures predicted for
unsheltered individuals in the Tokyo-Yokohama megacity complex corresponding to a
50-weapon attack on Japan. Note that there are many areas where a number of fall-20
out patterns overlap in such an attack, and the total exposure consists of the additive
component exposures.
Following Daugherty et al. (1986), we assume that 50% of the population will have a
sheltering factor of 3, and 50% a sheltering factor of 10. Hence, the true exposure, D
′
is, D
′
=D/3 or D/10. The response of a population to a given acute (48-h) dose of whole-25
body radiation is uncertain. The dose that is lethal to 50% of the exposed individuals
has been estimated in various studies to lie between 220 and 450 rad (Daugherty et
al., 1986). We use 450 rad in the present analysis. We further assume, based on
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Daugherty et al. (1986), that the fatality curve is linear with dose, and that the fatality
rate would be 100% at 600 rad, and 0% at 300 rad. Then the fraction of fatalities for a
given acute exposure (above 300 rad) is:
αradiationfatality = (D
′−300)/300; 0 < α < 1 (4)
The doses used in Eq. (4) are those modified for the effects of sheltering. Hence, the5
unsheltered dose rate that represents the threshold for lethality (from fallout alone) is
900 rad for 50% of the affected population, and 3000 rad for the other 50%.
Given these parameters the fallout from a 15-kt ground burst could be lethal to all
the survivors of blast and fire within a zone extending roughly 8 km downwind, and
0.35 km wide. At distances greater than about 22 km from ground zero, there would10
be few fallout fatalities, although radiation sickness would affect a substantial number
of individuals exposed to radiation at 100–300 rad (with effects potentially exacerbated
by other stresses, and the absence of an organized medical response). Between the
epicenter of the explosion and 22 km, there would be zones of varying widths in which
a fraction of the population suffers lethal exposure. For example, the dark purple areas15
illustrated in Fig. 8b for the Tokyo-Yokohama megacity attack scenario would be subject
to numerous early fallout casualties.
There has been limited consideration in the literature of the effects of rainfall on
radioactive fallout (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). This is due in part to the fact that
most high-yield weapons rise and stabilize in the atmosphere well above the region20
where rainfall develops. However, the stabilized height of a 15-kt airburst debris cloud
is around 6000m, which is within the middle troposphere (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977).
The top of the Nagasaki mushroom cloud was estimated to be 4000–5000m, with a
base near 1200–1300m (Ishikawa and Swain, 1981). It follows that a 15-kt yield device
initially deposits its radioactivity in the middle to lower troposphere. In this case, rapid25
removal is likely if the atmosphere is unstable and rainfall is occurring in the region. For
this reason, atmospheric nuclear tests were detonated in remote locations, in part to
avoid local rainfall effects (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). Precipitation might scavenge
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radioactive debris from the plume of an airburst at the same rate as dry sedimentation
removes radioactivity from a ground-burst cloud. Moreover, rainfall could potentially
deposit twice as much radioactivity locally following an airburst as a ground burst in
dry weather, since in the latter case only about half the radioactivity is in the form of
particles large enough to be deposited as early fallout.5
For the scenarios considered here, Tables 4 and 6 provide estimates of the fatalities
due to the early fallout from single and multiple ground bursts without rainfall. While
the radiation casualties are substantial in the cases treated, the total of blast, fire and
radiation fatalities for ground bursts are found to be somewhat lower in general than the
direct fatalities of an airburst of equivalent yield. Rainfall has the potential to increase10
radiation fatalities significantly.
Delayed, as opposed to early, radioactive fallout generally occurs within the first day
or two after a nuclear explosion, and far downwind of ground zero. Global-scale fallout
is associated mainly with high yield weapons whose radioactivity is deposited initially
in the stratosphere, and is then slowly removed over the globe. Intermediate fallout is15
associated with radioactive debris that remains trapped in the troposphere, and which
is deposited regionally. About 500 nuclear weapons were exploded in the atmosphere
worldwide prior to the nuclear test ban treaty, with a total yield expended of more
than 400Mt. Of greater relevance here, 100 airburst weapons with an average yield
of 10 kt were detonated over the Nevada test site (NTS). About 61 of these devices20
had a high enough yield to produce measurable radioactivity beyond the NTS (Bouville
et al., 2002). The tests were deliberately conducted in locally dry conditions, so that
the debris would remain aloft as long as possible, decaying and dispersing before
returning to the surface. Occasionally hot spots, such as in northern New York State,
occurred as a result of rainfall scavenging. In the U.S., the overall cumulative external25
population exposure associated with the 100 small weapons exploded at the NTS was
comparable to that connected with the global fallout from the 400Mt of large weapon
tests (Bouville et al., 2002). The smaller bursts were more effective per unit fission
yield because the shorter-lived fission radioisotopes were much more rapidly deposited
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(Bouville et al., 2002). The radioactive debris from the larger weapons was injected
into the stratosphere, where it decayed significantly before reaching the ground. In
counties downwind of the NTS, average exposures of the order of 300mrad have been
estimated (Bouville et al., 2002), which is comparable to the average annual radiation
dose from natural radioactivity.5
In a regional-scale nuclear war, radiation doses over large areas would most likely
exceed doses experienced during the NTS series. For one thing, the detonations would
occur simultaneously rather than over a decade of time, and would be deposited in the
same restricted area. Moreover, local rainfall is more probable in the regions con-
sidered here, and could significantly exacerbate the local and regional deposition of10
radioactivity. The fallout simulation illustrated in Fig. 8a shows, for example, that most
of the greater Tokyo area, and extending more than 100 km downwind, is subject to
unprotected 48-h doses of 50 to 200 rad. In the same zone, the cumulative dose be-
tween 1 day and six months would be roughly half the values for 48-h – still a very
substantial exposure equivalent to perhaps a thousand times background. Under such15
circumstances, it is likely that only a small fraction of the population would remain within
the urban complex, being limited mainly to those directly engaged in disaster relief and
civil defense activities.
The unorganized evacuation of 10’s of millions of people over days and weeks from a
megacity complex would most probably be chaotic and lead to many additional deaths20
and injuries. The economic impacts of abandonment of a major center of commerce
would have national and international dimensions. Individuals would be unlikely to re-
turn to such a site for years, and in many cases would seek to relocate permanently.
Lessons in this regard are found in recent natural disasters such as the Indonesian
tsunami of 2004 and hurricane Katrina in 2005. Although both of these disasters were25
limited to coastal areas, the longer-term consequences have had much farther reach.
Six months after the Katrina event, for example, the U.S. had spent tens of billions of
dollars on relief and rebuilding efforts but had hardly progressed in making the city of
New Orleans, which was extensively damaged and abandoned, habitable again. While
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we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical,
social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been
performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson,
1989). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physi-
cal outcomes.5
While regional and global fallout are not likely to cause substantial fatalities follow-
ing a war between states with small arsenals (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977), it is much
more likely that large urban areas around target points would be permanently aban-
doned, especially following ground bursts–or airbursts under rainy conditions. A nu-
clear explosion releases many short and long-lived radionuclides, amounting to roughly10
30 000MCi per kiloton of fission yield at one minute after detonation (Glasstone and
Dolan, 1977). Thus, the evacuation of large regions would be necessary immediately
after a nearby surface burst. However, the deposition of long-lived radioisotopes, as
occurred after the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in April 1986, would make early
recovery and re-colonization untenable in contaminated zones. Chernobyl released15
about 2.5MCi of
137
Cs and 0.27MCi of
90
Sr, (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2002). In con-
trast, 50 nuclear explosions of 15 kt fission yield would be expected to release about
0.2MCi of
137
Cs and 0.14MCi of
90
Sr, both with half-lives close to 30 yr. Notably, the
local deposition following Chernobyl was attenuated owing to the small particle sizes re-
leased by the reactor, and most of the activity dissipated over long distances, whereas20
early radioactive fallout would concentrate activity locally. Nevertheless, shortly after
the Chernobyl accident, a region of 2800 km
2
was evacuated, which exceeds the total
area affected by blast in the nuclear scenarios considered here. Several other radioac-
tive “hotspots” were located within a few hundred kilometers of Chernobyl where rain-
fall deposition occurred. In total, 3100 km
2
was contaminated by
137
Cs at levels above25
40Ci/km
2
, 7000 km
2
at levels between 16 and 40Ci/km
2
, and 103000 km
2
between 1
and 5Ci/km
2
(Nuclear Energy Agency, 2002). Eventually the Soviet Union adopted a
ground-contamination upper-limit of 40Ci/km
2
of
137
Cs for permanent resettlement of
population, and 15–40Ci/km
2
for temporary relocation. In this latter zone, consumption
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of contaminated food remains strictly controlled; the 193 000 people living here in 1995
received an annual dose below 500 mrads (where 300 mrads is the average annual
dose received from natural background radioactivity) (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2002).
Sixteen years after the accident, 4000 km
2
of agricultural land remained abandoned,
including the entire area within 30 km of the reactor. Following the attack scenarios5
considered here, slightly smaller total areas might be abandoned or strictly controlled,
but these areas would be within, or adjacent to, current megacity centers. Accordingly,
the population and economic assets affected would dwarf the Chernobyl values.
The uncertainty in computing the radioactivity deposited from the explosion of 50
weapons with 15 kt yield lies in variables such as the local wind speed, and whether it10
was raining during the explosion. However, the greatest uncertainty is due to targeting
issues, such as whether ground bursts are used. Fatalities due to fallout exposure
depend on how well sheltered the population is, and how quickly it can evacuate the
region.
6 Smoke emissions15
During the early 1980s, numerous investigations of smoke emissions from burning
cities suggested that significant global-scale climate changes might occur following a
nuclear war (Alexandrov and Stenchikov, 1983; Turco et al., 1983; Pittock et al., 1989;
Turco et al, 1990). Climate changes could impact non-combatant countries worldwide,
and potentially lead to significant global casualties. At that time, significant climate20
effects were expected from 100 high yield weapons being used on 100 cities, but given
the large numbers of weapons then available such a scenario did not seem likely. Here
we estimate the smoke generated from 100 low yield weapons being used on 100
targets, many of which may be co-located in a single megacity. Robock et al. (2006)
evaluate the climate changes that may occur from this estimated smoke release.25
It is not practical to employ currently limited information on land-use in hundreds
of urban complexes around the world to determine accurately the local and regional
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distributions of combustible materials that could be ignited by nuclear bursts. To esti-
mate fuel loadings for the present work, we make a basic assumption that within urban
zones there is a direct relationship between the quantity of fuel available and the local
population density. Contributing to the fuel load would be dwellings, offices, industries
and infrastructure such as schools, transport and fuel depots, shopping malls, and so5
on. Given the relationship between fuel loading and population density we can use
population density data as a surrogate for fuel loading data. In the next section we
discuss the relationship between fuel loading and population density, as well as other
parameters needed to determine the smoke emissions. Next we discuss the altitude to
which the smoke plumes might rise. We then apply this technique to determine smoke10
emissions from attacks on a number of cities and countries.
6.1 Estimating fuel loading and smoke emissions
We estimate the mass of carbonaceous smoke (often referred to as elemental carbon,
or soot) emitted by fires ignited by a single detonation in a specific location as follows:
Me =
J∑
j=1
PjAj
{
Mf
(∑
i=1,n
FiQiSiCi
)
R
}
(5)15
Here, Me is the total mass of the potential soot emission. The outer sum, j , is over
all grid cells in the region affected by the explosion and subject to fire ignition. Pj is
the population density (people/km
2
) within the grid cell j , which can be determined
using an appropriate population database for the area (LandScan, 2003). Aj is the
area of the grid cell, or the fractional area impacted by fire. In summing, we include20
a total of J cells arranged symmetrically around ground zero such that the total area
burned following a 15-kt explosion is 13 km
2
, equivalent to that consumed at Hiroshima
(Glasstone and Dolan, 1977).
The term within brackets does not vary with location around ground zero in this treat-
ment. The key parameter, Mf , represents the baseline per capita mass of fuel of all25
11769
ACPD
6, 11745–11816, 2006
Consequences of
regional scale
nuclear conflicts
O. B. Toon et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
◭ ◮
◭ ◮
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
EGU
types estimated for the nation and locale of interest. In practice, we establish a base-
line for the developed world circa 1980, and scale the results for other circumstances
(see below). In the past, two techniques have been employed to determine the base-
line fuel burden. Turco et al. (1990) analyzed the total quantities of various types of
flammable materials that were produced and utilized annually in developed nations.5
Then, with an estimate of the relevant residence time (in years) for each material, the
total quantities of fuel were determined. The most extensive information available at
the time related to the 1980’s. The total amount of all fuels in the developed world at
the time was estimated to be 11.4±3.6×103 Tg (teragram, or 1012 g=106 metric ton),
where the range represented the minimum and maximum likely values. Dividing by the10
total population of the developed world in 1980 – about 1.1×109people – a mean value,
Mf=1.1±0.4×10
7
g/person, was derived.
An alternative approach to find Mf was taken by Small (1989) and Bush et al. (1991).
They surveyed land-use in a cross-section of U.S. cites, and incorporated data on the
amounts of combustible materials in typical structures, including various types of res-15
idences, industries and businesses. Their analysis yielded a total quantity of fuel in
U.S. urban “target zones” of about 1322Tg. Specifically, the targeted areas were delim-
ited using an attack scenario that involved hundreds of megaton-sized weapons. How-
ever, Small (1989) did not quantify the number of individuals affected within targeted
cities, stating more generally that one-half of the entire urban-suburban area of the20
U.S. lay within the target zones. Using the entire urban population of the U.S. in 1980
(152 million), a lower limit of the fuel per capita would therefore be 8.7×106 g/person.
Assuming that one-half of the population resided in target zones at the time, the inferred
per capita fuel loading would be 1.7×107 g/person. These results roughly bracket the
range derived by Turco et al. (1990). Accordingly, a baseline per capita fuel burden,25
Mf , of 1.1×10
7
g/person is adopted here. Later, we return to the question of modern
fuel loadings, and combustibles in other parts of the world.
In Eq. (5), Fi is a fraction that divides the total combustible mass loading into different
types, or categories, i (refer to Tables 8 and 9). Qi is the fraction of a fuel type that is
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assumed to burn following nuclear ignition, and Si is the mean elemental carbon emis-
sion factor for that fuel type (Tables 8 and 9). To adjust the estimated smoke emissions
for national differences in fuel characteristics, a parameter, Ci , is also specified as the
ratio of the fuel type per person in the city in question to the fuel type per person in the
developed world in 1980. Finally, to account for smoke removal in “black rains” induced5
by firestorms, the average fraction of emitted elemental carbon that is not scavenged
in fire-induced convective columns is specified by the parameter, R, which is assigned
a baseline value of 0.8 (see below).
Assuming for the moment that C and Q are unity, the value of the bracketed term in
Eq. (5) – based on the data in Table 8 – is 0.016 g(soot)/g(fuel) (Turco et al., 1990). Al-10
ternatively, using the data in Table 9, the value is 0.020 g(smoke)/g(fuel) (Small, 1989).
An important difference between these estimates is the fraction of fuel in the category
of wood and wood products. A more subtle difference is that Turco et al. (1990) esti-
mate the mass of soot generated by fires, while Small (1989) gives the total amount of
smoke, of which soot is a partial component. Comparing specific absorptivities, or ab-15
sorption cross-sections per unit mass, in m
2
/g(smoke), we find that Turco et al. (1990)
used 7m
2
/g(soot) while Small (1989) assumed 4.4m
2
/g(smoke). These numbers are
better normalized by converting specific absorptivity to the absorption coefficient per
unit mass of fuel burned (that is, by combining the emission factor and specific ab-
sorptivity), which yields a value of 1.1×10−1m2/g(fuel) for Turco et al. (1990), and20
8.6×10−2m2/g(fuel) for Small (1989). These two values are in very reasonable agree-
ment. In subsequent paragraphs, we discuss alternative values for Mf and C.
To scale fuel loading from population density, we employ a linear relationship that is
represented by the solid line in Fig. 9. This relationship corresponds to the baseline
fuel mass per person, Mf=1.1×10
7
g/person, being distributed over an area of 1 km
2
25
(10
10
cm
2
), yielding a slope of 0.0011 g/cm
2
per person/km
2
. Figure 9 also compares
this baseline model with several other estimates of fuel burdens relative to population
density. Bush et al. (1991) studied specific area-averaged fuel loadings in 6 regions
of the U.S. based on urban land-use patterns, assigning fuel loadings according to
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standard land-use categories. Bush et al. (1991) also provided data on the urban
population density in each of these areas. We assumed that these urban population
densities applied to the roughly 50% smaller urban areas they used to determine fuel
loadings. Their results are indicated by the yellow symbols in Fig. 9. After calibrating
against population, we carried out a linear regression for the fuel loading versus pop-5
ulation density data points. The regression yielded a zero-population fuel loading of
about 0.8 g/cm
2
, which is roughly consistent with the background urban and residential
vegetation fuels assumed by Bush et al. (1991). Because of this mean background
fuel component, the average fuel loadings derived by Bush et al. (1991) are higher (by
about 40–60% ) at the lowest population densities than the baseline model in Fig. 9.10
Even so, background vegetation has been ignored in the present analysis in favor of
the linear model in Fig. 9. Also shown as a dashed line in Fig. 9 is the extrapolated
regression corresponding to the data of Bush et al. (1991), which exhibits curvature at
low population densities owing to the background fuel contribution. Significantly, the
two fuel loading models extrapolate to very similar values (within ±10%) at the higher15
population densities typical of megacity centers.
For the cases considered by Bush et al. (1991) the mean fuel loadings are relatively
low. This can be explained in large part by the fact that Bush et al. (1991) sought
to estimate the average fuel loadings that would apply to large yield nuclear weapon
detonations over typical, moderate-sized U.S. cities, such as Nashville, Tennessee.20
The footprint of a large weapon encompasses areas far removed from a city center.
Hence, on an area-weighted basis, the average fuel loading is likely to be dominated
by low values in uninhabited areas around cities, and in residential areas. Similarly,
low average population densities would be predicted for target zones associated with
high-yield detonations. For example, a 150-kt explosion is capable of igniting an area25
of 100 km
2
, which would likely include extensive suburban tracts with low population
densities, especially in smaller U.S. cities. While both the mean population density and
fuel loading will be biased toward lower values in such cases, the average per capita
fuel loading might actually be higher, even without background vegetation, because of
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the larger square footage associated with residential property. Importantly, when Bush
et al. (1991) considered higher density housing districts, predicted fuel loadings were
much greater, reaching 9 g/cm
2
in one area of Nashville, for example. This points to
the fact that smaller detonations aimed at urban centers should be expected to ignite
much higher fuel densities on average than larger yield weapons.5
Simonett et al. (1998) analyzed components of the fuel load for San Jose, California.
They documented the numbers and types of buildings, and used literature-derived fuel
loads for each building type to deduce an average fuel loading of 0.94 g/cm
2
within the
city boundaries. The analysis omitted various types of fuels, such as stored petroleum
and asphalt in roofing, but estimated that the total fuel load might be 1.34 g/cm
2
. Using10
the 1980 San Jose population of 629 246, and a city area of 440 km
2
, we obtain a
population density of 1370 people/km
2
at the time. The average San Jose fuel loading
then falls slightly below the baseline curve in Fig. 9.
Several investigators have determined fuel loads for the portions of Hamburg that
experienced firestorms during World War II (Fig. 9). The population density in the15
burned sections of Hamburg was roughly 20 000 people/km
2
(Lucas et al., 1990). Ebert
(1963) cites fuel estimates by German fire engineers of 32 g/cm
2
of wood in one area
of the city center. The SCOPE assessment (Pittock et al., 1989) cites the fuel loading
in Hamburg as 47 g/cm
2
, while OTA (1979) gives 16 g/cm
2
, although neither source is
clear on the origins of these values. Schubert (1969) carefully investigated the wood20
loading in two sections of Hamburg with areas of 0.37 km
2
and 0.45 km
2
, finding values
of 16 and 12g/cm
2
, respectively. Peczkis (1988) described Dresden’s city center in
WW-II as being dominated by 5-story residences covering a significant fraction of the
land area; combustible loadings for such buildings were used to estimate an average
fuel burden of 22 g/cm
2
. This value is likely to be low since it omits the large amounts25
of coal stored in the city. A population density was not given.
Similar fuel studies based on land use have not been carried out for the dense inner
regions of modern cities. Three types of characteristic American cities circa 1980
were hypothesized by Larsen and Small (1982), leading to fuel burden estimates within
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the inner 2-km-radius urban cores of 23, 41, and 63g/cm
2
. In the annular region 2–
6 km from the city centers, the corresponding fuel densities were estimated as 7, 11,
and 18 g/cm
2
, respectively. By contrast, the average fuel load for 50 high population
density U.S. urban targets that we derive below using population density is 12 g/cm
2
(Sect. 6.3). These results provide support for the idea that high average fuel densities5
are associated with nuclear detonation scenarios in which small bursts are aimed at
population centers.
The fuel loading per person in the developed world may be greater than that in the
developing world, so that the values of C in Eq. (5) may be less than unity. We have
found no specific detailed analysis of fuels in megacities in developing countries. How-10
ever, a variety of relevant indirect data available for large urban areas worldwide has
been considered to assess the possible variance in C. Table 10, for example, com-
pares vehicle ownership per capita, and solid waste created per person, in a variety of
megacities (Decker et al., 2000). It is plausible that vehicle usage is related to the quan-
tity of petroleum stored and used in cities. Excluding Los Angeles, these data indicate15
that megacities in the developing world have on average about 0.38 times as many
vehicles as megacities in the developed world, with considerable overlap in specific
cases. Similarly, solid waste generation may correlate with the abundances of paper,
cardboard, plastics, and other combustible materials, including certain foodstuffs, that
are available in urban zones. Cities in the developing world generate roughly half the20
solid waste per capita as cities in the developed world, suggesting that, on this basis
the fuel loading may be correspondingly lower.
Using country-level data to derive fuel burdens per capita may underestimate fuels
in cities because urban populations are likely to have more wealth, property, and in-
frastructure resources than rural populations. This is especially true in the developing25
world, where the fraction of total population in urban areas is ∼40–60% as compared
to 70–80% in the developed world (as of 2000; Table 11), while urban growth in the
developing world is much faster. As a crude measure of relative national economic
activity and wealth, carbon dioxide emissions per capita (Marland et al., 2005) can be
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compared for different regions of the world (Table 11). Adopting an average emission of
2 metric ton-Carbon/person for the “developed” world, and assuming that fuel availabil-
ity is proportional to carbon emission, we estimate that relative fuel per capita, or the
factor C, could range from 0.10 to 0.75 in the developing countries listed in Table 11,
with an average value of 0.33. Since CO2 emissions are dominated by fossil fuel con-5
sumption, however, this probably represents a significant underestimate of the relative
total quantities of combustibles in cities. Further, the more rural nature of populations
in developing nations also biases such an estimate of C toward lower values.
Another potential measure of fuel loading, given in Table 12, is human appropriation
of net primary productivity (HANPP) (Imhoff, 2004). This quantity represents the aver-10
age amount of food, wood, paper and fiber consumed per person. It includes, mainly,
cellulosic materials that dominate the fuel mass in the developed world (Tables 8, 9). As
pointed out by Imhoff (2004), the ratio of HANPP between the industrialized countries
and the developing nations is about 0.56. This value is comparable to other measures
of the parameter, C.15
Considering the data in Tables 10–12 discussed above, we conclude that the pa-
rameter, C – the ratio of the average fuel loading per capita for urban dwellers in the
developing world to that in the developed world – may currently lie in the vicinity of
∼0.5. We also note that the more plausible proxies for combustible burdens indicate
values of C larger than 0.5.20
A secondary issue concerning the value of C is whether the fuel loading distribution
in Tables 8 and 9, or the mass of fuel per person, Mf , has changed significantly since
1980 (the basis year for the present analysis). The population of the developed world
increased by about 12% between 1980 and 2000. At the same time, the carbon dioxide
emitted per person in developed countries has not changed significantly (Table 11).25
The steady carbon dioxide emissions suggest that the per capita inventory of stored
fossil fuels has remained relatively stable. By comparison, the volume of sawn wood
used per capita in the developed world declined to about 78% of its 1980 value by
2000 (FAOSTAT, 2005). This decline, however, was offset by a large increase in the
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amount of plywood, pressboard, and similar building products in use. Accordingly, the
overall per capita consumption of such materials has changed by less than 10%. For
the U.S., per capita utilization of wood products remained approximately constant from
1960 to 1995 (Matos, 1998). Turco (1986) predicted that plastics use in the developed
world would double by the year 2000. Indeed plastics consumption per capita in the5
U.S. doubled between 1980 and 1995 (Matos, 1998). Doubling the plastics inventory
in Table 8 leads to an increase in the soot emission factor from 0.016 g (soot)/g (fuel) to
0.018 g (soot)/g (fuel), suggesting that C could be increased by about 13% to correct
for increased plastics usage worldwide.
An issue that was widely discussed in previous work is the extent of smoke rainout10
in fire-driven convective columns (Pittock et al., 1989; Turco et al., 1990). Here, we
adopt a baseline value for the rainout parameter, R (the fraction of the smoke emis-
sion not removed), of 0.8, following Turco et al. (1990). This relatively high value for
R implies inefficient removal of smoke in the pyrocumulus systems driven by an ur-
ban fire. Observations of such convection associated with forest fires are consistent15
with smoke particle over-seeding of capping cumulus clouds, which severely inhibits
induced precipitation. As a consequence, essentially no smoke removal is observed
in pyrocumulus plumes that stabilize below about 5 km (Andreae et al., 2004). Ac-
cording to Andreae et al. (2001) in natural fires the ratio of injected smoke aerosol
larger than 0.1µm to enhanced carbon monoxide concentrations is in the range 5–20
20 cm
3
/ppb near the fires. Jost et al. (2004) found ratios ∼7 in smoke plumes deep
within the stratosphere over Florida that had originated a few days earlier in Canadian
fires, implying that the smoke particles had not been significantly depleted during in-
jection into the stratosphere (or subsequent transport over thousands of kilometers in
the stratosphere). Such evidence is consistent with the choice of R=0.8. Conversely,25
smoke emitted at low altitudes and transported downwind into regions of active convec-
tion and precipitation may be significantly diluted prior to entrainment, allowing more
efficient removal. For example, some observations at altitudes near 10 km of smoke
plumes processed by deep tropical convective systems remote from originating fires
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have yielded smoke to CO ratios of about 1 cm
3
/ppb (Andreae et al., 2001), suggesting
extensive rainout of the aged accumulation mode smoke aerosol. The prompt removal
of smoke from urban fires, by inference and observation, is much less efficient. Fur-
ther, as has been suggested in past studies of large fire plumes, it appears that solar
heating and stabilization of extensive smoke clouds aloft further inhibits longer-term5
rainout (Robock et al., 2006).
6.2 Altitudes of smoke columns
Smoke can be scavenged by rainfall, which declines rapidly with altitude and essen-
tially ceases above the tropopause. It follows that the altitude of smoke injection and
stabilization plays an important role in determining the overall lifetime of injected smoke10
material. There are two mechanisms controlling the altitude to which smoke will rise.
The first is lofting by pyro-convection occurring above large combustion zones. A
substantial observational and theoretical database is being developed based on pyro-
convection seen in forest fires and convective simulations for intense heat sources.
The second lofting mechanism is solar heating of elevated smoke plumes. Here, some15
observational evidence also indicates such lofting in nature. In relation to the present
work, Robock et al. (2006) discuss indications of strong self-lofting in their numerical
simulations of large smoke plumes, and provide information that illustrates the role of
pyro-cumulus injection height on subsequent scavenging rates.
Following a nuclear explosion the nuclear fireball rises to its peak altitude in a few20
minutes. For the 15 kt explosions investigated here the nuclear fireball is expected to
rise to about 6 km as discussed previously (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). However,
the fires generated by the explosion take several hours to fully develop. Hence the
injection height of the smoke is controlled by the energy release from the burning fuel
not from the nuclear explosion. The energy released in a fire initiated by a nuclear25
explosion is much greater than that released by the explosion itself. About 39% of the
yield energy of a nuclear explosion is converted to heat, which can contribute to the
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lofting of the fireball. Hence a 15 kt explosion releases about 2.4x10
13
J of thermal
energy. In Hiroshima, about 13 km
2
of fuel was ignited by the 15 kt explosion (Isikawa
and Swain, 1981). Assuming a fuel loading of 16 g/cm
2
with an energy content of air-
dried wood (15×103 J/g), the energy release from the Hiroshima fires would have been
about 3×1016 J. This is more than 1000 times greater than the energy release from the5
atomic explosion. Not only is the energy output by combustion much greater than from
the detonation itself, the energy is released over a period of several hours, leading to
efficient convective pumping.
The nuclear explosion at Hiroshima occurred at about 8:15 am local time. According
to Isakawa and Swain (1981) it took about 30min for the fires to become widespread.10
A violent mass fire (sometimes called a firestorm) with strong winds occurred from
11:00 a.m. to 03:00 p.m. The winds calmed at around 05:00 p.m. Therefore, the
fuel load was consumed over a period between 4 and 9h. Assuming all the fuel was
burned in 4 hours the power release would have been about 2×106MW. Per unit area
the energy release rate was 1.7×105W/m2, or about 130 times the solar constant.15
Similar energy release rates have been computed for the Hamburg mass fire and for
simulated fires in large cities attacked with nuclear weapons (Pittock et al., 1989).
Forest fires can approach the same energy release as mass fires. Westphal et
al. (1991) investigated a very large Canadian fire, which they estimated produced about
0.45Tg of smoke. The Canadian fire apparently consumed 95% of the biomass, taken20
to be 1.5 g/cm
2
, over 720 km
2
of forest during a period of 24 h. The energy release
rate was therefore about 1.9×106MW averaged over 24 h, which is comparable to the
Hiroshima energy release rate discussed above, although spread over 50 times the
area.
Much interest in plume rise was directed at the Kuwati oil fires set by Iraqi forces25
in 1991. Small (1991) estimated that oil well fires produce energy at a rate of about
300MW. Since the wells were separated by roughly 1 km, they represent a very small
energy source relative to either forest fires or mass fires such as occurred in Hiroshima.
Hence these oil well smoke plumes would be expected to be confined to the boundary
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layer, and indeed were observed within the boundary layer during the Persian Gulf War.
There have been numerous observations of elevated smoke plumes from large fires.
For example, the Canadian fire plume discussed by Westphal and Toon (1991) was
estimated to have a top near 5 km. A similar Canadian smoke plume was studied by
Colarco et al. (2004) who estimated that the original smoke plume penetrated to heights5
as great as 6 km. Studies by Fromm and Servranckx (2003) show that intense forest
fires, in conjunction with deep convection can place smoke deep into the stratosphere.
Lavoue´ et al. (2000) determined a linear relationship between frontal fire intensity, and
height of the smoke injection based on forest fire data. For intense crowning fires in
Canada they suggest that the injections typically reach an altitude near the tropopause,10
with an average local injection height of 7.7 km. There are also limited observations
of smoke plume heights following mass fires. The Hamburg convective cloud was
estimated to have a top near 9 km (Ebert, 1963).
While these data suggest that smoke plumes above intense fires can rise to high
altitude, they do not address the issue of whether specific meteorological conditions are15
necessary. Trentmann et al. (2006) and Luderer et al. (2006) numerically investigated
the plume rise from a fire in Alberta, Canada near Chisholm during 2001 that placed
smoke directly into the lower stratosphere. The Chisholm fire line was estimated to be
about 25 km long, and about 0.5 km wide. As is typical of forest fires, but not nuclear
mass fires of the sort expected in urban areas, the fire line propagated, in this case at20
a velocity near 1.5m/s. Trentmann et al. (2006) and Luderer et al. (2006) show that the
pyro-convection at Chisholm was driven by instability in the atmosphere and depended
on special meteorological circumstances. However, their simulations suggest that the
plume rise is not sensitive to the amount of moisture in the fuel, nor to the presence of
large numbers of aerosols in the plumes.25
Figure 10 combines the plume rise data from Lavoue´ et al. (2000) with the calcula-
tions of Trentmann et al. (2006) and Luderer et al. (2006) for varying energy release
rates. The calculations of Trentmann et al. (2006) and Luderer et al. (2006) suggest
that the linear relationship between height and fire line intensity suggested by Lavoue
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et al. (2000) breaks down near the tropopause. Forest fires may have a difficult time
moving smoke deep into the stratosphere via pyro-convection, although observations
clearly show that forest fire smoke does quickly reach the deep stratosphere (Jost et
al., 2004; Fromm and Servranckx, 2003; Fromm et al., 2000).
Several numerical modeling studies have been conducted to investigate the altitude5
of the rise of the smoke plume from a mass fire (Fig. 11). Penner et al. (1986) simulated
fires of several physical sizes and energy release rates. They compared models and
simulations for the Hamburg fire, which suggested a plume peak altitude just above
the fire of 12 km, and downwind of 8 km, in agreement with the limited observations
available (Fig. 11). Small and Heikes (1988) studied nuclear generated mass fires of10
radii larger than 5 km. The atmospheres considered had stable lapse rates throughout
the troposphere. The simulated smoke plumes for the more intense fires had tops well
into the stratosphere, though the bases of the smoke plumes were near 4 km. Small
and Heikes found that for these large fires the smoke plume height was not sensitive
to the area of the fire, and was mainly a function of the rate of energy release per15
unit area. Penner et al. (1986) had also carried out simulations for such large fires,
assuming a stable lapse rate, and found similar results as Small and Heikes (refer to
Fig. 11). By contrast, Heikes et al. (1990) showed that for fires with radii below 500m,
the size of the fire had a significant affect on the altitude of plume rise. Penner et
al. (1986) calculated similar plume rise heights as Heikes et al. (1990) for 500m radius20
fires (Fig. 11).
The maximum plume rise altitudes for mass fires studied by Penner et al. (1986),
Small and Heikes (1988) and Heikes et al. (1990) are compared with the simulations
of the Chisholm fire by Luderer et al. (2006) in Fig. 11. For the Chisholm fire, we
converted the line intensity into an equivalent areal intensity by dividing by the width25
of the fire line, which was taken to be 500m. The comparison suggests, following
Heikes et al. (1990), that the fire radius plays an important role in the altitude reached
by the smoke plume. For fires whose diameters exceed an atmospheric scale height
(about 10 km), deep penetration of the tropopause and lower stratosphere occurs by
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pyro-convection. On the other hand, pyro-convection induced by fires with dimensions
well below an atmospheric scale height – such as line fires in forests, and the Hamburg
mass fire – place smoke primarily in the middle and upper troposphere.
As illustrated by Trentmann et al. (2006) and Luderer et al. (2006) large forest fires
may inject smoke into the lower stratosphere through pyro-convection. However, Jost5
et al. (2004) and Fromm et al. (2000) observed smoke deep within the stratosphere.
Simulations using mesoscale models suggest that smoke from forest fires, which is
detrained from the pyro-convection, is able to rise further by motion induced by solar
heating of the smoke (G. Stenchikov, private communication, 2006; E. J. Jensen, pri-
vate communication, 2006). Robock et al. (2006), in an accompanying paper, show10
that such lofting also occurs in global scale simulations forced by the smoke from a
regional nuclear conflict.
We conclude that mass fires in urban areas ignited by 15-kt sized explosions are
likely to have smoke plumes rising into the upper troposphere, although the initial
smoke plumes are unlikely to penetrate the tropopause unless the fire radius exceeds15
several kilometers. Further numerical simulations of mass fires of a few kilometers
radius would be useful to better understand the behavior of pyro-convection for fires
of this scale, and the dependence of plume rise on ambient meteorology. It should
be noted that Figs. 10 and 11 refer to the peak altitude of the smoke plume. As illus-
trated by Penner et al. (1986), and Small and Heikes (1988) among others, smoke is20
detrained over a wide range of altitudes. Even for fires with tops well into the strato-
sphere, a substantial fraction of the smoke emissions are detrained in the troposphere.
Once lofted into the upper troposphere, however, further lofting of the smoke may occur
due to solar heating of the smoke plume itself. As a conservative estimate of the initial
smoke injection heights for the scenarios studied here, and by Robock et al. (2006)25
we will assume as a baseline case that smoke is uniformly injected within the 150–
300mb layer in the upper troposphere, although higher and lower injection layers are
also considered.
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6.3 Calculations of the smoke emissions in a regional conflict
We use the LandScan (2003) population density database as a fuel-loading database
by summing the product of P and Mf over a fire zone. The fuel loadings summarized in
Table 13 represent averages over the fire zones in 50 target areas in various countries
as an example of typical fuel loadings. For a 15-kt explosion, we assume the fire zone5
area is equal to that of the Hiroshima firestorm – 13 km
2
– ignited by a weapon of
about the same yield. The fuel loadings in Table 13 are comparable to those derived
for U.S. urban cores, and old European cities at the time of WW-II as discussed above,
and summarized in Fig. 9.
Using Eq. (4) we calculated the elemental carbon emitted in each target area in a10
number of different countries. Figure 12 shows that different countries have different
smoke emissions, and within a country the emissions differ between targets. These
differences are due to variations in population density and hence fuel loading. The
analysis, summarized in Table 13, suggests that an attack on a single country with 50
15-kt weapons might produce from slightly less than 1Tg to more than 5Tg of black15
carbonaceous smoke, after allowing for prompt rainout. Most of this “soot” would reside
in the middle and upper troposphere or above, where it may be subject to further lofting
(Pittock et al., 1989; Robock et al., 2006). It is possible that fuel loading in developing
countries is lower than in developed countries; although not applied in deriving Table
13, a factor of 0.33–0.5 was estimated in Sect. 6.1.20
Based on our analysis, U.S. urban centers targeted by 50 15-kt weapons would
generate about 1.2 Tg of elemental carbon. Small (1989) predicted that 37Tg of smoke
would be emitted in a full scale nuclear war involving 3000Mt of yield detonated on
4300 targets (about 1700 of which were rural military targets), including about 50%
of the U.S. urban and suburban area. The smoke production in our scenario scales25
almost linearly with the number of explosions in urban areas. However, the amount
of smoke per kt of yield is 100 times greater for small yield weapons than for large
yield weapons because fuel loading in city centers is much higher than the average
11782
ACPD
6, 11745–11816, 2006
Consequences of
regional scale
nuclear conflicts
O. B. Toon et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
◭ ◮
◭ ◮
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
EGU
over urban-suburban fuel complexes. In scenarios with large numbers of high yield
weapons, many detonations either overlap or impact sparsely populated regions with
very low fuel loadings.
There are many uncertainties in these estimated smoke emissions. We have as-
sumed that all the fuel in the region that is attacked burns (Q=1), and that very little is5
removed in induced convection (R=0.8), both of these assumptions are upper limits.
While the average fuel per person, Mf , that we use is within 10% between different
studies, we have assumed that people who live in dense urban areas have the same
average as those in less developed regions. Choosing the 50 most densely populated
regions in the U.S., for example, we deduce an average fuel load of 12 g/cm
2
, while10
Larson and Small (1982) deduced that the fuel load in the centers of dense American
cities might be 63 g/cm
2
. There is clearly additional work that is needed to obtain more
accurate estimates of the quantities of combustible materials in modern megacities,
particularly in the developing world. Studies of intense forest fires indicate that the
smoke from fires due to low yield nuclear weapon explosions will be injected largely15
into the upper troposphere. However, numerical modeling for fires of the sizes involved
here would be useful, as would additional studies of natural fires. Compared with other
uncertainties in the scenarios considered in the present study, such as the sizes and
numbers of weapons used in a possible “small” nuclear conflict, the fuel loading, and
smoke emitted are not likely to be the dominant sources of uncertainty in the environ-20
mental outcomes.
7 Impacts on atmospheric chemistry
The combustion of 63 to 313Tg of fuel will lead to the emission of 1–5Tg of soot, about
13Tg of CO (or ∼2% of the global inventory), and about 0.25Tg of NO (some tens of
percent of the annual stratospheric source of NOx) based on the emission values in25
Pittock et al. (1989). Large quantities of pyrotoxins will be emitted, particularly CO, and
near the fires these will be hazardous (Postol et al., 1986). However, serious global or
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regional scale impacts related to these gaseous emissions seem unlikely.
Stratospheric ozone loss has previously been predicted to follow the use of large
numbers of high yield nuclear weapons primarily in relation to NO injected by rising
fireballs. In the present case NO production is not large enough to cause significant
depletion of ozone. However, stratospheric soot injections, as projected here, might5
lead to substantial ozone perturbations. First, radiative heating by soot deposited in the
upper troposphere would force ozone-poor air to rise into the stratosphere, displacing
ozone-rich air (Kao et al., 1990; Robock et al., 2006). In addition, soot reaching the
stratosphere would cause strong local heating of the stratosphere, which in turn would
alter chemical reaction rates and further perturb stratospheric dynamics. In previous10
simulations of large-scale nuclear smoke clouds (Kao et al., 1990), such interactive
effects reduced total ozone by 50% at some Northern Hemisphere locations, while
increasing it by a similar amount at places in the Southern Hemisphere, all within 20
days of the detonations.
Soot, like other stratospheric particles, may also catalyze chemical reactions involv-15
ing key species such as HCl, leading to accelerated ozone loss. On the other hand,
carbonaceous aerosol may be consumed by reactions with ozone (Stephens et al.,
1989) and other oxidants, as well as exposure to ultraviolet radiation, reducing the
lifetime of soot at stratospheric altitudes. A full simulation of stratospheric chemistry,
along with additional laboratory studies, would be needed to evaluate the importance of20
these processes. It should be noted that rate constants for a number of potentially im-
portant reactions are lacking. Nevertheless, substantial stratospheric ozone depletion
is a likely outcome of the scenarios studied here.
8 Conclusions
To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers,25
creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same
time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they
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can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demon-
strate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities
approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thou-
sands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are
at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-5
three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to
assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-
100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those
of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an
air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan10
area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and ra-
dioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests,
the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely
have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects re-
sult even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most15
effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population
are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there.
Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists sup-
ported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted
for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably,20
the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of
nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al.,
2006).
There are many uncertainties in the analysis presented here. Some of them can be
reduced relatively easily. For instance, surveys of fuel loading in developing nations25
would reduce the uncertainty in the amount of smoke produced by urban fires. Nu-
merical modeling of urban mass fires, would reduce the uncertainty in smoke plume
heights. Investigations of smoke removal in pyro-cumulus would reduce the uncertainty
in smoke injections. The major uncertainties, however, are likely in our choices of sce-
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nario. We have chosen to target urban zones, which maximizes fatalities and smoke
generation. However, we have also used a very small number of low yield weapons
within the range of those controlled by the smallest current nuclear states. Much larger
arsenals are possible. Many scenarios can be constructed, some of which will lead
to fewer casualties, less radioactivity and less smoke emitted. The trivial example is5
that no effects will occur if no weapons are used. Other scenarios will lead to more
casualties, more radioactivity and more smoke. Our example uses less than 0.1% of
the yield of nuclear weapons that exist on the planet. The current build up of nuclear
weapons in an increasing number of states points to scenarios in the next few decades
that are more extreme than the one we considered. Each of these potential hazards10
deserves careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the
scientific community, as well as widespread debate.
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Table 1. Nuclear Weapons Inventories.
Country India Pakistan Israel China France Britain U.S. Russia
Date of analysis 2003 2003 2003 2003 2005 2005 2005 2005
Total # warheads 85(65–110)
a
52(44–62)
a
116(102–130)
a
400
b
350
c < 200d 5315e 7200f
# detonated
g
2–5 2–6 45 210 45 1030 715
# atmospheric tests
g
23 50 21 215 219
a
To compute the numbers of weapons for India, Pakistan and Israel, we used the Pu and HEU
estimates of Albright et al. (1997) for 2003. We assumed each weapon contained 5 kgPu or
25 kg of HEU. Parentheses indicate 5% and 95% confidence limits on Pu or HEU.
b
Norris and Kristensen (2003). 280 of these are strategic weapons.
c
Norris and Kristensen (2005c).
d
Norris and Kristensen (2005e).
e
Norris and Kristensen (2005f). 4535 of these warheads are for strategic weapons. There are
also 5000 intact warheads in reserve or in inactive stockpiles.
f
Norris and Kristensen (2005a). 3814 of these are strategic warheads. Another 9000 intact
warheads are in reserve or inactive stockpiles.
g
Norris and Arkin (1998).
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Table 2. The dates when various countries halted their nuclear weapons programs; whether
they have or once had HEU enrichment facilities, or Pu separation facilities; and the numbers
of nuclear weapons that might be constructed from Pu or HEU in their possession at the end of
2003 (Albright et al., 1997). For most countries, the Pu or HEU is in a civilian nuclear reactor
program.
a
Country Year abandoned HEU enrichment or Possible number Possible number
nuclear weapons program Pu separation facilities of Pu weapons, of HEU weapons,
10 kgPu per weapon 25 kg per weapon
Nuclear Weapons States
China Active HEU, Pu 910 880
France Active HEU, Pu 23610 1320–1372
Russia Active HEU, Pu 27120 43 520–44120
United Kingdom Active HEU, Pu 9630–10 240
United States Active HEU, Pu 50250 28 200
De Facto Nuclear Weapons States
India Active HEU, Pu 1390–1490
Israel Active HEU (?), Pu 56 1
Pakistan Active HEU, Pu 84 44
North Korea Active HEU (?), Pu 4 1
Non-Nuclear Weapons States
Argentina >1990 HEU, Pu 1100
Armenia 140
Australia <NPTb HEU (?) 14
Belarus Inherited 1990s 10–15
Belgium Pu 2350–2450 28–30
Brazil >1990 HEU, Pu 210
Bulgaria 850
Canada <NPTb Pu 13500 54
Czech Republic 620 3–5
Egypt <NPTb
Finland 1100
Germany HEU, Pu 9300–9600 56–108
Hungary 750 6–10
Iran Active HEU (?)
Iraq 1990s
Italy 650 4–8
Japan HEU, Pu 15160–15360 80
Kazakhstan Inherited 1990s 300 424–438
Latvia 1
Libya 2003 1
Lithuania 1000
Mexico 240
Netherlands HEU 300–390 29–32
Poland 20
Romania >1970 Pu 240 1-
Slovakia 840
Slovenia 270
South Africa >1970, created weapons HEU 580 24–30
South Korea > 1970 HEU, Pu 4400
Spain > 1970 2690
Sweden <NPTb 4180
Switzerland >1970 1750–2000
Taiwan >1970 Pu 2200
Ukraine Inherited,1990s 4100 6–10
Uzbekistan 4
Yugoslavia > 1970
a
Including irradiated and non-irradiated plutonium. Including HEU at all enrichment levels. Including material owned
by the country but not in its territory. We omitted
237
Np and Am which can also be used in weapons.
b <NPT indicates the program was abandoned at or before signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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Table 3. The characteristic widths, σ, of the fatality and casualty distributions obtained by fitting
data in Figs. 2 and 3.
Parameter Width of normal distribution
Hiroshima fatalities (Ougherson and Warren, 1956) 1.0
Hiroshima fatalities (Ishikawa and Swain, 1981) 1.15
Hiroshima fatalities + serious injuries (Ishikawa and Swain, 1981) 1.46
Hiroshima fatalities + all injuries (Ishikawa and Swain, 1981) 1.87
Hiroshima fatalities + injuries from (Ishikawa and Swain, 1981) 2.05
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Table 4. Potential Fatalities From a Single 15-kt Detonation in a Megacity.
Country Airburst Total Airburst Total Ground Burst Blast/Fire Ground Burst Radiation Estimated Fatalities, Equivalent Number
Fatalities: Fatalities: Fatalities: Fatalities: Previous Conflicts of Airbursts
Highest Density City Second Highest Density City Highest Density City Highest Density City
Argentina 223 000 156 000 111000 56 000 700
a
1
Brazil 385 000 266 000 207000 32 000 0 1
China 760000 592 000 450000 74 000 3320 000
b
6
Egypt 612 000 601 000 317000 111 000 8500
a
1
France 269000 198 000 144000 28 000 592000
b
3
India 571 000 469 000 419000 62 000 3000
a
1
Iran 287 000 274 000 155000 38 000 450000–730 000
a
2–3
Israel 225 000 161 000 132000 25 000 2800
a
1
Japan 223000 206 000 114000 31 000 2133 000
b
14
Pakistan 503 000 487 000 249000 103 000 3–8000
a
1
Russia 299 000 237 000 152000 35 000 17700 000
b > 50
UK 126000 111 000 76000 39 000 453000
b
5
U.S. 206 000 190 000 114000 44 000 405000
b
3
a
(Clodfelter, 1992). In the case of Iran, the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war was considered; for Egypt
and Israel, the 1973 war; Argentina, the 1982 conflict with the UK; India and Pakistan, the 1971
war.
b
(Ellis, 1993). Russian fatalities are derived from those for the USSR during WW-II.
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Table 5. Summary of casualties from one nuclear explosion of 15 kt yield.
a
Country Severe injuries/slight
injuries/total casualties, one
airburst, highest density city
(thousands)
Severe injuries/slight
injuries/total casualties, one
airburst, second highest
density location
(thousands)
Severe injuries/slight
injuries/total casualties, one
ground burst, highest den-
sity city
(thousands)
Argentina 123/179/526 77/102/335 70/109/290
Brazil 165/197/746 80/83/430 114/156/477
China 265/297/1,322 166/165/923 203/258/911
Egypt 317/450/1,379 264/342/1,207 184/283/785
France 126/166/561 92/123/418 79/116/339
India 249/327/1,147 212/273/954 160/230/709
Iran 127/157/571 134/197/606 84/119/358
Israel 81/91/397 65/74/300 60/78/271
Japan 117/163/503 117/177/500 68/104/287
Pakistan 272/381/1,155 261/363/1,111 159/242/651
Russia 157/229/685 100/142/479 92/140/384
UK 41/48/214 62/85/258 33/40/149
U.S. 94/131/430 77/103/370 58/85/257
a
Total casualties include fatalities plus all injuries. For the ground bursts casualties caused by
radiation are not considered.
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Table 6. Fatality estimates for 50 15-kt detonations in urban zones.
Country Blast and Fire Fatalities: Blast and Fire Fatalities: Radiation Fatalities:
Airbursts Ground Bursts Ground Bursts
Argentina 4 337 000 2 394000 810000
Brazil 7 962 000 4 370000 1834 000
China 16 716 000 9 306000 2554 000
Egypt 7 834 000 4 384000 1656 000
France 3 509 000 1 879000 923000
India 12 424 000 6 494000 2539 000
Iran 7 431 000 4 231000 1371 000
Israel 2 594 000 1 538000 323000
Japan 5890 000 3 023000 1766 000
Pakistan 9 171 000 5 112000 1525 000
Russia 6 273 000 3 543000 1299 000
UK 2891000 1 565000 792000
U.S. 4 056 000 2 203000 872000
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Table 7. Summary of casualties from 50 weapons with 15 kt yield
a
.
Country Severe injuries/slight injuries/total casualties, Severe injuries/slight injuries/total casualties,
50 airburst weapons (thousands ) 50 ground burst weapons (thousands )
Argentina 1846/2233/8415 1242/1736/5371
Brazil 3522/4445/15 929 2283/3267/9920
China 6955/8560/32 230 4755/6550/20 611
Egypt 3146/3623/14 604 2219/3011/9614
France 1570/1907/6986 1037/1472/4388
India 6069/7853/26 347 3731/5552/15 776
Iran 2890/3316/13 637 2064/2772/9067
Israel 868/918/4380 693/863/3094
Japan 2991/3953/12 834 1797/2716/7536
Pakistan 3830/4562/17 563 2597/3613/11 321
Russia 2468/2897/11 638 1762/2362/7667
UK 1287/1621/5799 845/1199/3608
US 1825/2305/8186 1176/1691/5070
a
Total casualties include fatalities plus all injuries. For the ground bursts radiation caused
casualties are not considered.
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Table 8. Fuel parameters for developed world circa 1980 (Turco et al., 1990).
Material Fuel Mass, Tg
a
Fraction of mass Elemental carbon F*R*S*C*Q
c
in a given category, F emission factor, S
b
Wood/lumber 9450±3150 0.83 0.01 (0.002–0.02) 0.0066
Primary and secondary 1190±310 0.10 0.06 (0.03–0.10) 0.0048
petroleum products
Plastics and polymers 430±30 0.04 0.08 (0.05–0.10) 0.0026
Asphalt roofing 375±125 0.03 0.1 (0.06–0.13) 0.0024
a
Mass in the developed world circa 1980, mid-value ± extremes.
b
Typical value, range in parentheses.
c
C,Q assumed to be unity, R=0.8.
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Table 9. Fuel parameters for U.S. circa 1980 (Small, 1989).
Material Fuel Mass, Tg Fraction of mass Smoke emission F*R*S*C*Q
a
in a given category, F factor, S
Wood 592 0.45 0.009 0.0032
Paper 71 0.05 0.005 0.0002
Plastics/Rubber 136 0.10 0.071 0.0057
Hydrocarbons 278 0.21 0.037 0.0062
Cloth 58 0.04 0.017 0.0005
Food (dry ) 13 0.01 0.013 0.0001
Asphalt 42 0.03 0.121 0.0029
Urban Open 132 0.10 0.012 0.001
a
Assuming R=0.8, C and Q=1.
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Table 10. Data from cities related to fuel loads (Decker et al., 2000).
City Population Vehicles Solid waste C vehicles/C
Millions (1995) per person (kg/day/person ) solid waste
b
Developed World
London 7.3 0.370 2.4/
Los Angeles 12.4 0.645 3.2
a
4.1/1.64
Moscow 9.2 0.072 0.5 0.46/0.25
New York 16.3 0.109 1.6
a
0.7/0.82
Osaka 10.6 0.069 0.4/
Tokyo 26.8 0.164 2.5 1.05/1.3
Average Developed World 0.238 (0.156)
c
1.95
Developing World
Beijing 12.4 0.025 0.16/
Bombay 15.1 0.039 0.5 0.25/0.25
Cairo 9.7 0.097 0.5 0.60/.25
Calcutta 11.7 0.043 0.28/
Delhi 9.9 0.168 1.2 1.1/0.62
Karachi 9 .9 0.066 0.4/
Shanghai 15.1 0.010 0.06/
Tehran 6.8 0.066 0.4/
Tianjin 10.7 0.027 1.6 0.17/0.82
Average Developing World 0.060 0.95 0.38/0.49
a
Multiplied by 2 to account for urban area mismatch in population and waste.
b
C values are based on assuming the developed world value is 0.156 vehicles per person or
1.950 kg of waste per day per person.
c
Average in parentheses ignores Los Angeles.
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Table 11. Carbon dioxide emissions as a measure of combustible material per capita.
Country CO2 emissions 2002/1980, % urban 2000/1980 Inferred C
e
metric ton- Carbon/person (United Nations
(Marland et al., 2005) Secretariat, 2006)
Developed world
Central Europe
c
2.03/2.40 1
Oceania
d
2.74/2.25 74 (71) 1.4
U.S. 5.52/5.48 77 (75)
a
2.8
Western Europe 2.05/2.17 73 (69)
b
1
Developing world
China 0.74/0.41 36 (20) 0.37
Egypt 0.59/0.28 54 (44) 0.3
India 0.32/0.14 41 (23) 0.16
Iran 1.50/ 0.81 64 (50) 0.75
Pakistan 0.2/0.1 33 (28) 0.1
Average developing world 0.33
a
North America
b
Europe
c
includes former USSR
d
includes Japan
e
Assumes CO2 emissions
for the Developed World is 2.0 metric ton-C/person.
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Table 12. Human Appropriation of Net Primary Productivity (HANPP) (Imhoff et al., 2004).
Location HANPP (metric ton-Carbon/yr )
Africa 2.08
East Asia 1.37
North America 5.40
South America 3.11
South Central Asia 1.21
Western Europe 2.86
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Table 13. Estimated fatalities, and soot generation for 50 15-kt detonations in urban zones.
Country Total Soot Generation (Tg ) Average Fuel Loading
(g/cm
2
)
Argentina 1.41 13
Brazil 2.22 21
China 5.22 50
Egypt 2.63 25
France 1.05 10
India 3.67 35
Iran 2.4 23
Israel 0.85 8
Japan 1.92 19
Pakistan 2.9 28
Russia 1.89 18
UK 0.91 9
U.S. 1.2 12
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Fig. 1. (top): Number of nuclear warheads in Russia (USSR), the U.S. and the total for all the
Nuclear Weapons States (Norris and Kristensen, 2002). (About 10 000 Russian warheads of
indeterminate status were omitted ). Russia and the U.S. have more than 95% of the warheads
worldwide. The number of warheads began to fall after 1986 following the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty, and by 2002 was about one-third of its value at the peak in 1986. Current
treaties do not require a future reduction in the numbers of warheads, only a reduction in the
numbers of warheads that are on strategic delivery systems. (bottom): The arsenals of China,
France and Britain have also remained stable or declined in the past two decades. Note the
factor of about 100 change in scale between (a) and (b).
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Fig. 2. The fatality curves from Hiroshima ((OW)-Oughertson and Warren, 1956; (IS) Ishikawa
and Swain, 1981) and Nagasaki (Oughertson and Warren, 1956), and a normal distribution fit
to the Hiroshima data from Ishikawa and Swain (1981) with a standard deviation σ=1.15.
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Fig. 3. The casualties in Hiroshima (Ishikawa and Swain, 1981), as well as normal distribution
fits to these data with σ=1.46 and 1.87. Casualties are defined either as the sum of fatalities
plus all major injuries, or fatalities plus all injuries, even relatively minor ones.
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Fig. 4. Targeted areas in the Tokyo/Yokohama, Japanese megacity complex are identified for
the scenario used in the present analysis. The axes are latitude and longitude. Of the 50
hypothetical Japanese targets, 28 are located in this urban complex. Circles of 2-km radius
define the areas around target points where fires are likely. The blue shades indicate fatalities
per grid cell from an airburst. No fatalities occur in the gray regions, which are shaded according
to population per grid cell.
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Fig. 5. Total fatalities predicted for specific megacities in several countries. The numbers on
the bars represent the percentage of the country’s fatalities occurring in the megacity. Buenos
Aires, Cairo, London, Moscow, New York, Paris, and Tokyo account for 46–59% of their national
fatalities for the scenario treated.
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Fig. 6. Potential fatalities caused by airbursts of 15-kt yield on each of 50 targets in the countries
listed.
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Fig. 7. (top): Potential unsheltered 48-h whole-body gamma ray dose downwind of a 15-kt
ground burst based on the simplified fallout model documented in Table 9.93 and Fig. 9.26 in
Glasstone and Dolan (1977). These values do not include reductions for surface roughness,
or for purposeful sheltering. The 48-h period of exposure is assumed to begin when fallout
reaches the distance indicated, although roughly 80–90% of the total dose is received within
the first 24 h. For an assumed 24 km/h steady wind with minimal vertical shear, the initial
times range from about 10min to 2 h after detonation. (bottom): Ground zero width of a given
dose contour based on the same model (for example, the ground zero cross-sectional width
of the area contour in which the 48-h unsheltered dose is at least 1000 rad is about 1 km); the
maximum width occurs downwind of the burst at a distance determined by the wind speed at
ground zero but varies little from the ground zero width. For each set of data, a power law fit is
shown.
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Fig. 8. (top): Map of estimated radiation doses (rads) for unsheltered individuals in the Tokyo-
Yokohama megacity. The axes refer to latitude and longitude. The black circles locate ∼2-km
radius zones of destruction by fire around each target. (bottom): Locations where most of the
fatalities due to early fallout would occur (the darker purple contours indicating very high fatality
rates per grid cell, as discussed in the text). The background shading depicts the population
per grid cell, with the darker grey representing the highest density. Both the radiation cells and
the radiation fatality grid cells are 1/25 the area of a population grid cell.
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Fig. 9. Information relating areal fuel loading, FL, to population density, P , is summarized. Data
points are based on land-use studies for a number of cities: San Jose, Simonett et al. (1998);
Hamburg, OTA (1979); Hamburg, Ebert (1963); Hamburg, Pittock et al. (1989); U.S., Bush et
al. (1991). The solid black line corresponds to a linear relationship, F L∝P , or ∆ ln F L=∆ ln P ,
with no background (zero population) contribution to the fuel loading. The dashed curve is an
extrapolation of a linear regression derived using data published by Bush et al. (1991); in this
case, a background fuel loading associated with urban/rural vegetation was included, which
leads to the curvature seen at low fuel loadings.
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Fig. 10. Smoke plume heights from forest fires versus the fire line intensity. The red and yellow
boxes and the blue and red x’s are the Kruger, Internation Crown Fire, Bor Forest and Red
Lake fires studied by Lavoue´ et al. (2000). The red circles are the computations from Luderer
et al. (2006). A logarithmic fit to the data is shown by the solid line, whose equation is given on
the figure.
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Fig. 11. Heights of plumes from mass fires with varying radius, compared with the heights from
a forest fire as a function of area intensity.
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Fig. 12. Estimated carbonaceous smoke emissions per target for each of 50 targets. Smoke
emissions vary between different targets because of different population densities.
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